Ira Bodenstein, the trustee liquidating Peregrine, in a notice Wednesday told holders of currency and precious metals accounts with the firm that addressing their claims was his "next agenda item," though no decisions have been made on how these will be handled or how much money these customers may get back.

"If the Bankruptcy Court concludes that payment in full to forex and metals customers is appropriate, there are sufficient funds to accomplish that outcome," Mr. Bodenstein wrote. "If the Bankruptcy Court reaches a different conclusion, there are sufficient funds to address whatever treatment of these claims that the Bankruptcy Court orders."

garyfritz wrote:Vision is taking over PFG accounts: http://www.futuresmag.com/2012/10/05/vi ... g-accounts

I suspect this only applies to futures accounts. I don't think Vision does forex.

Given the current broad inclusion of retail forex within the scope of the CEA, CFTC Regulations and NFA Rules, as well as the CFTC‘s core mandate to protect the investing public, it defies logic to deny retail customers who trade such contracts the same statutory protections now afforded all other market participants, including institutional dealers in cleared currency swaps and options. It would be equally unjust and irrational, given the wide ranging regulatory controls to which retail forex is now subject, to attempt to exclude this most vulnerable class of customers from the single provision most directly protective of their economic interest.

In total, there are 7,000 clients with forex and metals accounts at PFG, but Medley says the impact of the case could be much broader. “We feel like this is a precedent-setting case with respect to the rights of forex and metals account holders, and how it relates to the CFTC regulations.”

Roe says the CCC has not made a decision on how to argue this but says, “The important thing once this is all said and done is that we don’t have a precedent at PFG that once someone steals something out of segregation, it doesn’t matter. That would mean segregation protection is completely meaningless,” he says. “The NFA said in its brief in the MF Global case that the intent of Congress was not to have to trace funds when the music stopped. If they aren’t there and there is a hole, you have to replace those with substitute assets. In this case, the substitute asset is FX customers’ money.”

This customer protection proposal incorporates these NFA rules into the Commission’s regulations so that the CFTC can directly enforce these important rules. Under this proposal, FCMs would be required to:

• Hold sufficient funds in Part 30 secured accounts (funds held for U.S. foreign futures and options customers trading on foreign contract markets) to meet their total obligations to customers trading on foreign markets computed under the net liquidating equity method. FCMs would no longer be allowed to use the alternative method, which had allowed them to hold a lower amount of funds representing the margin on their foreign futures;

• Maintain written policies and procedures governing the maintenance of excess funds in customer segregated and Part 30 secured accounts. Withdrawals of 25 percent or more would necessitate pre-approval in writing by senior management and must be reported to the designated SRO and the CFTC; and

• Make additional reports available to the SRO and the CFTC, including daily computations of segregated and Part 30 secured amounts.

Beyond the NFA rules, additional reforms in this proposal benefited from the CFTC’s broad outreach and consultation with the SROs and market participants, as well as substantial feedback from CFTC Commissioners. They include:

• First, bringing the regulators’ view of customer accounts into the 21st century by giving the SROs and the CFTC direct electronic access to FCMs’ bank and custodial accounts for customer funds, without asking the FCMs’ permission. Further, acknowledgement letters and confirmation letters must come directly to regulators from banks and custodians.

• Second, increasing disclosures to customers regarding the risks associated with futures trading and using FCMs to invest their funds. Futures customers, if they wish, should have access to information about how their assets are held, similar to that which is available to mutual fund and securities customers. FCMs would be required to provide current and potential customers with specific information about the FCM’s risks.

• Third, enhancing controls at FCMs regarding how customer accounts are handled, including policies and procedures on supervision and risk management of customer funds.

• Fourth, setting standards for the SROs’ examinations and the annual certified financial statement audits, including raising minimum standards for independent public accountants who audit FCMs.

• Fifth, requiring FCMs to ensure they back up segregated customer accounts with funds to cover potential margin deficits.

• Sixth, implementing a more effective early warning system for the Commission and the SROs that alerts them to certain problems, including a) when an FCM’s funds are insufficient to meet the targeted residual interest in customer accounts b) when there is a material adverse impact to the FCM’s creditworthiness and c) when there is a material change to the FCM’s clearing or financial arrangements.

• And seventh, instituting a liquidity requirement for FCMs, in addition to the existing capital requirement, to better detect FCMs that have become distressed and may put customer funds at risk.

Prior to this proposal, the Commission already made some important improvements to protections for customer funds. They include:

• The completed amendments to rule 1.25 regarding the investment of funds that bring customers back to protections they had prior to exemptions the Commission granted between 2000 and 2005. Importantly, this prevents use of customer funds for in-house lending through repurchase agreements;

• Clearinghouses will have to collect margin on a gross basis and FCMs will no longer be able to offset one customer’s collateral against another and then send only the net to the clearinghouse;

• The so-called “LSOC rule” (legal segregation with operational comingling) for swaps ensures customer money is protected individually all the way to the clearinghouse; and

• The Commission included customer protection enhancements in the final rule for designated contract markets. These provisions codify into rules staff guidance on minimum requirements for SROs regarding their financial surveillance of FCMs.

A red flag that has come up in several cases is inadequate auditing. A large futures broker or investment firm should have, if not one of the big four, an institutional level auditor. The Sam Israel Bayou Hedge Fund, Bernie Madoff and PFG scandals all used sole proprietor or inadequate auditors. While the big guys have messed up as well, a large firm managing hundreds of millions of dollars shouldn’t be hiring someone working out of his (or her) garage. If they do, it is a blazing red flag.

Publicly traded companies like MF Global have numerous reports they must file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and, as a registered FCM, MF Global had to submit monthly segregated account reports to the CFTC. These reports can reveal a lot of information, though many of them, especially SEC filings, can be dense and hard to interpret if you don’t know what to look for. Find someone who does.